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criminal convictions before they had entered the Army, more than half of
them for breaking and entering. After joining, these same men committed
.an average of 2.5 offenses, most of which occurred while they were deserters
or AWOL from training while on the continent. They were apparently un-
able to withstand the monotony and "hurry and wait" of routine training,
but there was no lack of bravery under fire. The 100 ex-service prisoners
at Maidstone exhibited almost the same characteristics as the Dartmour men:
in the Armed Forces they continued the criminal behavior pattern already
established in civil life, and in the post-war society, unable to face the dis-
organized conditions to which they returned, they again took the easy way
out. The analysis of the Borstal boys is of special interest. Shortly after the
outbreak of the war, about two-thirds of the Borstal boys were released from
the institutions and about seventy per cent of them were inducted into the
Army. Despite their progressive institutional life they did not respond to
army discipline. Apparently the disturbed and unstable conditions of their
childhood unsuited them for military duty.
The final portion of Crime and the Services recounts the careers of 200
imprisoned men who had entered military service after their discharge from
civil prisons. The behavior of these men follows the same general pattern as
those at Dartmour, Maidstone, and the Borstals, and demonstrates the futility
of permitting men who have long criminal records or those with marked de-
linquent traits to enter the Armed Services. They lacked that important
quality so prized by the British as "sticktuitiveness."
Mr. Spencer has shown that neither enlistment in nor discharge from the
Services is an antidote to delinquency. Civil authorities and the military ob-
viously cannot shift the burden of rehabilitating the maladjusted serviceman
to each other. If a nation engages in total war the problem of crime must be
met on a total basis, in both the civil community and the military, employing
the best knowledge and services the nation can provide.
WALTER A. LUNDENt
N.A.T.O. AND ITS PROSPECTS. By Wing-Commander J. D. Warne. New
York: Frederick A. Prae'ger, 1954. Pp. vii, 110. $3.00.
Tis small volume by a British officer who -has served with both NATO
and the United Nations is an acute personal analysis of the capacity of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to function effectively. It is a valuable
report on inter-allied mobilization for defense, if for no other reason than that
it poses concretely the issues of resource contribution and distribution. Irre-
spective of one's agreement or disagreement with the author's conclusions, the
book is a healthy contrast to many official documents which are the product
of semantic compromise.
TProfessor of Criminology, Iowa State College.
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This country has been the beneficiary of similar semi-personal studies on
domestic problems of mobilization. Shorty after World War II there appeared
a series of monographs dealing quite candidly with such problems and attempted
solutions. Although published by the Government Printing Office and written
largely by civil servants on "Government time," to the amazement of many they
were not mere apologia. Some of the monographs were too descriptive, but
this is hard to avoid when particular authors had not personally e:.perienced
the real pressures of the programs considered. The most significant of the
monographs were a set of fifteen in the price control field,' developed under the
editorship of Harvey J. M[ansfield, now professor of government at Ohio State.
Unfortunately but few copies of the price control monographs were put to
use when the Korean mobilization of 1950 came upon us. Part of this mis-
fortune arose out of the anti-OPA bias in certain Administration circles, hut
much more was-due to their physical unavailability. Eventually discovery of
the value of the monographs led to the reproduction of many, and in
1952 to a decision to attempt another program of historical analysis
covering the Korean program. A few of the new monographs were completed
in early 1953, but lack of funds made Government reproduction impossible.
Important monographs in the materials allocation and rent area,- fortunately
had been reproduced earlier, and a labor union bore the expense of printin- a
volume on wage regulation. In the Autumn of 1954, Law and Conie'norary
Problems published in revised and shortened form eight of the monographs on
the major policy problems of Korean price control,2 and more recently the
Indiana Law Journal has given seventy-eight pages to a summary version of
the outstanding report on coordination of wage and price control. 3
The literature on international mobilization is meager; yet one of the major
obstacles to a functioning European alliance is the resolution of numerous
supply-price problems. That these already abound is suggested by the repeated
recommendations from the military commanders for a counterpart "eco-
nomic Eisenhower." The Financial and Economic Board, the Defense Pro-
duction Board, and the Temporary Council Committee of NATO were steps
in this direction. In some quarters it was hoped that the European Defense
Community (EDC) presented the answer to organization for economic co-
ordination, but with its failure to become a reality, efforts along NATO or
possibly other allied lines become more pressing.
It is conceivable that NATO's economic efforts might go beyond the inter-
national supply-price problem. That problem alone contains implications for
resource allocation between NATO and non-NATO countries, allocations
between the different parts of NATO, particularly since the concept of "North
1. Usually referred to as "Historical Reports on War Administration."
2. Symposium, Price Control In A Co!d War, 19 LAw & CoiQNvz. Peoni. 475-604.
See also Symposium on the Mobilization Base, 13 Fzo. B.J. 141 (1933); Sympoium,
Price Control: Prospect and Retrospect, 38 IoWA L. R-v. 209-333 (1953).
3. Kaufmann, The Problem of Coordinating Price and Wage Programs i 1q59)-5S,
29 IND. L.J. 499-537 (1954) ; 30 id. 13-53.
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Atlantic" appears ever-expanding, and determinations of the civilian share of
national production. It could even affect such matters as taxation, wages,
currency convertibility, customs, and living standards. Certainly it involves
searching organizational questions, such as whether a military alliance is the
most appropriate vehicle for effective economic collaboration.
Attempts at economic coordination cannot, of course, avoid consideration of
the destructiveness of new weapons, any more than can efforts toward military
collaboration. In this country the domestic aspect of this new factor has been
reflected in the planning activities of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the
successor agency to the National Security Resources Board. In general, this
planning considers (1) the kind of problems posed by the Korean experience,
(2) those raised by the conventional full-scale World War II type of mobiliza-
tion, (3) full scale mobilization required by an atomic attack upon the conti-
nental United States, and various modifications of each of these.4
But these more speculative factors flowing from the destructiveness of new
weapons should not be permitted to impair examination of changing economic
and political developments, which, of course, have relevance to the atomic
attack situation, but which have major bearing on Government programs for
the Korea-type or full-scale World War II type mobilization. For example,
at the present time the American stockpile of strategic and critical materials is
far more favorable than at any time in the past; the "mobilization base," or
capacity to produce defense goods, is at its peak; both personal and corporate
liquid assets are substantial; and, except for particular areas, the level of em-
ployment and wages is quite high. These new phenomena undoubtedly will
make a difference in the operation of any future mobilization program in which
this country participates, irrespective of whether the new weapons are em-
ployed.
Commander Warne persuasively suggests that a full-blown operating NATO
has a long way to go, and that the only way major objectives can be achieved
is by having the Organization continually bite off bits and chunks, preferably
of a size that it is capable of digesting. These conclusions sound as though they
come from a man fully aware of the development of Parliament's power, and
perhaps too that of our Federal Union. If NATO does this kind of nibbling
successfully in the economic sphere, the generals may well become political
leaders by default, leaving the civilian politicians behind to argue the merits
of a movement which is already in progress. War, we say, is too important
a matter to turn over to the generals alone; in this century the generals may
come to conclude that economic preparedness is too important to leave to the
politicians alone.
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